The Devdopment of Children's Knowledge of Sdf-Contrd Strategies Cmu) DEVELOPMENT, 1983, 54, 603-619 2 studies traced the development of metacognibons about self-control m chddren through grade 6 The results indicated that chddren hegin to understand 2 basic rules for effecbve delay of gratificabon hy about the end of their fifUi year cover rather than expose the rewards, and engage in taskonented rather than in ccmsummatory ideation whde waiting By grade 6, chddren significantly indicated that abstract ideation would help delay more than coosummatoiy ideation. In the delay paradigm, young 4-yaar-olds seem to create self-defeatmg ddemmas for themselves hy choosmg (or even creatmg) a temptmg environment without adequately anbcipabng that they wdl he unable to execute strategies to overcome the temptation tliis preference for the delaydefeatmg strategy (exposme the rewards) waned toward the end of the fourth year and was rq>laced by a growmg preference for the delay-facditatmg strategy (covenng the rewards) l^eoretical reasons for this developmental course were discussed
leamed untd recently about the way m which mental representations of rewards and outcomes affect the mdividual's pursuit of them Recent research, therefore, has focused especially on the problem of reward representabon m situabons in which children attempt to delay immediate smaller gratificabon for the sake of more desirable but deferred goals The mtent has been to better understand how the mental representabon of the relevant rewards m a contmgency might infiuence voluntary delay for those outcomes (Mischel, 1981a) A body of "rules" about condibons that objecbvely facditate children's ability to wait m this paradigm (Mischel, 1974 (Mischel, , 1981a ) has begun to emerge from investigations of the effects of varymg attenbon to the rewards and the chdd's ldeabon durmg delay In general, chddren can delay most effecbvely for a chosen deferred gratmcabon if durmg the delay pCTiod they shift their attenbon from the relevant gratificabons and occupy themselves intemally vwth cognibve distracbons Situabonal or self-mduced condibons that shift attenbon from the reward objects appear to facihtate voluntary waibng times appreciably In order to bndge the delay effecbvely, it IS as if chddren must make an mtemal notabon of what they are waitmg for, perhaps remmd themselves of it penodically, but spend the remaimng bme attendmg to other less frustratmg intemal and external sbmuh, thereby transfonmng the noxious mto the easy and takmg the thmkmg and the worrymg out of waitmg and "wdl power "
More specifically, one of the most basic rules IS that delay is easier when the rewards are not m view For example, preschool chddren were found to endure self-imposed delay of gratificabon 10 times longer when the rewards for which they waited were obscured rather than exposed dunng the delay penod (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970) Even with the rewards physically facmg the child, delay time vanes widely dependmg on what the chdd IS domg or thmkmg Delay bme increases dramabcally when chddren are distracted from the rewards by playing with a toy or are mstmcted to think about pleasurable "fun" acbvibes (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1972) Thmkmg about the delayed rewards even when they are not m view appears to have a debilitabng effect on the young child's abihty to wait for them (Mischel et al, 1972) However, how the chdd thinks about the rewards substantially affects delay time even when the reiwaids are m full view Mischel and Baker (1975) mstmcted preschoolers to cognibvely transform reward objects facmg them dunng the delay They found that consummatory or "hot" ideabon directed at the rewards for which the chdd was waitmg (eg, focusing on their taste) severely hindered effecbve delay, whde nonconsummatory or "cool" ldeabon about the rewards (focusmg on their abstract quahbes) greatly helped to maintain the delay On the basis of these and related results, Mischel (1974) concluded that "hot" reward-onented ideabon decreases delay by making it more aversively frusbative and arousmg In contrast, delay is facihtated by ideabon about the task conbngency and by "cool" ideabon focusmg on the abstract (rather than consiimmatory) features of the rewards Subsequent work has supported and extended the origmal findmgs and interpretabons Thus, Miller, Weinstem, and Kamiol (1978) compared the effects of reward-oriented and task-onented ideabon on the delay bmes of kmdergarten and third-grade children m a self-imposed delay situabon They found that both age groups delayed longer m the task-oriented condition ("I am waitmg for ") and waited less when they made reward-oriented statements ("The rewards are yummy") Toner and Snudi (1977) have reported simdar results with preschool and second-and third-grade girls At both the preschool and grade-school levels, ideabon focusmg on the delayed rewards ("The candy will taste good") residted in less delay time than ldeabon about the value of waitmg ("It IS good if I wait") Further support comes from a foUow-up study with preschool chddren by Toner, Lewis, and Gnbble (1979) Toner (1981) allowed one group of preschoolers to chose to verbalize the task-centered versus the reward-centered utterance dunng the waibng period He found that chddren who chose the reward-centered statement waited significantly less time than chddren who were told to use the reward-centered statement and chddren who passively heard it Likewise, chddren who spontaneously engage m distractive acbvibes, or who report having generated distracbve cogmbons durmg the delay penod, tend to delay longer (Yates etaL, 1981) .
In sum, a rapidly growing hterature is providmg further empmcal support for the hypothesis that delay behavior m chddren is facihtated by distracbon from the rewards and parbcularly by ideabon that draws attenbon away from the consummatory quahbes of the rewards either by focusmg on the abstract quahbes of the rewards or on the delay task itself This apparently rehable set of objective factors underlymg the abdity to delay can now serve as criteria against which we can compare the chdd's own developing knowledge and use of effecbve strategies for delay
The two studies to be presented here are part of a program of research designed to help clanfy the development of chddren's knowledge and understanding of the types of sbmulus condibons and cogmbve acbvity that are likely to either facihtate or lmpau: their own self-control In these studies we also began to explore chddren's ovra strategies for deahng with a delay-of-grabficabon situabon and for self-control in everyday hfe situabons We employed several convergent operabons to assess this knowledge and to chart the developmental course of the child's understanding of the effect of ideabon about the rewards in a conbngency and on the abdity to delay gratificabon m pursuit of them
Study I

OVERVIEW AND DESIGN
In a delay-of-gratificabon paradigm (Mischel, 1974) , chddren of different ages (preschool and grades 3 and 6) were asked whether it would help them wait if the delayed rewards were exposed or covered during the delay penod They were then asked to suppose that the rewards would be left uncovered and to tell us what they could say to themselves to help them to wait Follovwng this, the children were presented with two pairs of phrases and asked to select the one from each pair that they would say to help themselves to wait One pair consisted of ldeabon focusing on the consummatory properties of the rewards ("The marshmallows are yummy and chewy")-known objecbvely to impede delay (Mischel, 1981a )-^versus ldeabon focusmg on the task acbvity ("I am waibng for the two marshmallows")-^known to facditate delay (Toner & Smith, 1977) The other choice paired consummatory ideabon (as above) with abstract ideabon ('The marshmallows are puffy like clouds")-known also to faahtate delay (Mischel, 1974) Followmg the request for the child's own strategies and followmg each ideabon choice we asked for the chddren's reasons "How will saying help you to wait for the two marsmnallowsP"
Mischel and Mischel 605 SUBJECTS Subjects were 24 preschoolers, 35 third graders, and 35 sixth graders from a primardy upper-middle-class populabon attendmg schools in Stanford, Cahfomia In the preschool sample there were 11 females and 13 males, rangmg m age from 3-5 to 5-2, with both mean and median ages of 4-3 The third-grade samj^ consisted of 21 females and 14 males, rangmg in age from 8-0 to 8-11, with both mean and median ages of 8-6 The sixth-grade sample contamed 22 females and 13 males, ranging m age from 10-6 to 11-11, with a mean age of 11-5 and a median age of 11-6 PHOCEDUBE Preschoolers were mterviewed mdividually m a small room at the Bmg Nursery School of Stanford Umversity They were assigned randomly to one of three mterviewers Each interviewer (two males and one female) saw approximately equal proporbons of males and females and equal numbers of chddren above and below the mean age All sessions were tape-recorded Elementary school chddren were mvited to come to a small room at their school after school hours They read desenpbons of the delay situabon and answered questions pnnted m booklets that they read and m which they wrote at their own pace STIMULI AND DESIGN
The Delay Sttuatton
In mdividual sessions, preschoolers were presented with the standard self-imposed delay procedure descnbed m detad previously (e g , Mischel, 1974 , Mischel & Baker, 1975 Briefiy, m this procedure the chdd is seated jn a chair m front of a table with a bell and an upside-dowTi cake pan on it The expenmenter says that somebmes he has to go out of the room and demonsbates how the didd can summon his retum by rmgmg the bell The experimenter lifts the cake pan, reveahng three miniature marshmallows-two grouped together and one apart The delay contmgency IS explained to the chdd two marshmallov*^ if the child waits for the expenmenter's retum, but only one if she nngs the bell to bnng him back to end the delay earher Comprehension of the conbngency is assessed m a senes of quesbons "If you sit m your chair m front of the The elementary school children were given the idenbcal mformabon but m wntten form m the booklets that descnbed the same situation Specifically, the youngsters were asked to "Suppose a grown-up comes to your school and takes you into a room " lllustrabons of the table, bell, and marshmaliows depicted them m the same arrangements as presented to the preschoolers The quesbons assessmg their comprehension of die delay contmgency were pnnted m the booklets with space provided for the chddren to wnte their answers All chddren demonstrated comprehension
Chotce to Cover versus Expose the Rewards durmg Delay
All children were asked whether it would help them most to wait for the two marshmallows if the marshmallovv^ were left out or if they were covered whde they were waibng The altematwes were stated to the preschoolers m altematmg order and were repeated with contmued altemabons untd the duld clearly comprehended the choice to be made
The elementary school children were instructed to "suppose you reaDy want to get the two marshmallows" and to dieck the condibon (cover vs expose) that would "help me to wait for the two marshmallows" The order of the altemabves was reversed m onehalf of die booklets
Eltcttatton cf Self-generated Delay Strategies and Inquiry
Next, all children were asked what they could say to themselves to help them wait with the rewards left out in front of them Preschoolers who had chosen to have the rewards covered were mstructed to "Suppose I have to leave the marshmallows out on the table" All preschoolers were then asked, "When I go out of the room-^while you are waitmg for the two marshmallows on the table here m front of you-what can you say to yourself that wdl help you to wait?" After the chdd responded, the experimenter mqunred how saying this would help the child to wait. Elementary school diildren read "Suppose the grown-up says she has to leave the marshmallows out on &e table When she goes out of the room whde you are waitmg tor the two marshmallows on the table m front of you, what can you say to yourself that will help you to wait?^ (Blank lmes were provided here for the chdd's response ) "How will that help you wait?" (Addibonal blank lmes were provided here )
Ideation dunng Delay Chotce and Inquiry
Finally we presented the chddren with two pairs of phrases and asked them to choose a phrase from each pair which they would say to help them wait for the two marshmallows These phrases ware idenbcal for both preschool and elementary sdhool chddren consummatory ideabon ("The marshmallows taste yummy and chewy") was paired once with task-onented ideabon ("I am waiting for the two marshmallows") and once with abstract ideation ("The marshmallows are puffy hke clouds") The order m which the two pairs were presented was alternated, as was the order withm each pair Preschoolers hstened to and then rehearsed saying the phrases aloud before they made their selections Elementary school duldren read the altematives and marked thenanswers in the booklets After each choice the children were asked how their choice would help them to wait
Control for Ideation Preferences tn a Nortdelay Context
In previous work, some of the children were observed to especially enjoy hearmg and repeating abstract ideabon atxnit the rewards (Mischel & Baker, 1975) , which may have parbcular appeal to them as a newly discovered simde Consequently, we employed a control condibon designed to assess any systemabc preferences for the abstract versus consummatory ideabon phrases apart from their potential value for facditabng or impainng waitmg for the relevant rewards For this purpose, half the chddren m each age group were first presented with a list of pairs of statements and the mstmcbon to pick the one diat "is more fun to say to yourself " The target pan-(consummatory vs abstract ldeabon about the rewards) was imbedded m random order m a list vwth pairs of statemraits about five irrelevant items, for example, "The flower is preth^ and soft" or "The fiower smells good and sweet" This control procedure was admmistered to the preschodters m a separate session approximately 3 weeks before the mam stucfy The pairs were read to the children, and tiiey were helped to rehearse each statement m a pan: before makmg their dmices The elementary sdhool cMdren were given the same hst of nondelay choices in written form on the first two pages of their booklets To discourage tummg back and modifying their responses as they proceeded though the booklet, the msbiicbon, "DO NOT tum back," was printed at the bottom of the appropriate pages The children were observed to comply with this request
RESULTS
Chotce of Delay Strategies
Preliminary y* tests showed no sex differences approaching significance, therefore, males and females were combined m the following data analysis The overall data, summanzed in Table 1 , revealed an orderly developmental sequence m children's knowledge of mles for effecbve delay of gratificabon Let us consider this sequence for each choice measure separately
Covering versus exposing the rewards - Table 1 shows the developmental progression m children's awareness that it helps to cover the rewards rather than have them avadable for attenbon dunng the delay period Preschoolers chose to have the rewards exposed somewhat more often than covered, but this difference was not significant (-j^Kl) By third grade, chddren systemabcally indicated that it would help to have the rewards obscured dunng the delay penod, x^( 1) = 4 36, p < 05, and sixth graders showed the same preference most markedly, x*(l) =9 26, p< 002 Thus there was a significant hnear age effect, x^(2) =8 35, p< 01
Task-onented versus consummatory ideation-Preschoolers showed no systemabc preference for task-oriented versus consummatory ldeabon (x=* = 174, N S ) Thn-d graders strongly preferred task-oriented over consummatory ideation, x* (^) -^ ®2, p < 002, as did sixth graders, x*(l) =1297, p < 001 (see Table 1 ) The linear age effect on the preference for task-onented ideabon was highly significant, )^{2) =1160, p< 003
Abstract versus consummatory ideation -Recall that with half the sample we mcluded a control condibon to assess the chddren's possible preferences outside the delay context for self-instmcbons focusmg on abstract versus consummatory features of the re'ward objects Consummatory ideabon about the reward objects was strongly preferred (N = 35) to absbract ideabon (N = 11) m the nondelay context by all age groups, x^(l) = 6 72, p < 01 This preference occurred at each age level, with no significant differences between age levels An exammabon of the subsequent consummatory versus absbact ideation choices in the delay situabon by the children who had taken part m the nondelay assessment showed that they were simdar at every grade level to those of children who did not have this prehminary measure Thus there was no systemabc effect on later delay choices from the nondelay context choices Analysis of the children's preferences for abstract versus consummatory ideation as a delay sbategy was highly lnformabve (see Table 1 ) Specifically, neither preschoolers nor third graders showed a significant preference for abstract versus consummatory ideabon m the delay context Sixth graders, however, strongly indicated that absbact ideabon would help delay more than consummatory ideation, x^(l) =1128, p < 001 The linear age effect was also significant, 2(2) =8 38, p< 01
Correlations between age and delay knowledge -Correlabonal analyses confirmed the picture provided by the x^ analyses of the children's choices Each child was assigned a 'Tcnowledge score" from 0 to 3 for the number of correct answers given about the basic delay mles (cover/expose, consummatory/ task-onented, consummatory/ abstract) The correlabon between these taiowledge scores and age was 452 {N = 94, p < 001) for the total sample
Strategtes Suggested by the Children
Next, consider the strategies for waibng Non -Numbers do not always add to total If because lome chOdren refused to make some choices that the chddren themselves suggested Recall that after makmg the choice to have the rewards either covered or exposed each chdd was asked to tell us what they could say to help them wait with the rewards m view on the table m front of them (Preschoolers who had chosen "cover" were told, "Suppose I have to leave the marshmallows out when I leave the room", elementary chddren read m their booklets the plurase "Suppose the grown-up says she has to ")
Civen the lack of systemabc knowledge of effecbve delay rules revealed by the preschoolers' choices, it IS not surpnsmg that their own verbalized sbategies were not very lnformabve For example, only seven preschoolers could tell us what they would say to themselves while waitmg with the rewards in full view Four of these were self-mstnicbons about the delay contingency or the task requirement-for example "Waibng for the two marshmallovi^" (4-0), "OK, I get two or one" (4-4) The remammg three chddren suggested acbvities that wovud distract their attenbon from the rewards-for example, "I guess 111 go to outer space " (anythmg else?) " I think 111 take a bath" (4-3) Most preschoolers gave no answer or said "I don't know" (N = 13), others gave answers unintelligible to us (N = 4)
In contrast to the preschoolers, 66 of the 70 elementary school chddren expressed potentially useful strategies for delay, consistent with the understandmg revealed by their choices among objecbvely effective versus meffecbve altematives A content analysis by two independent raters of the third and sDcth graders delay strategies suggested the following categones task onented, disbacbon, cognibve transformabons, and posibve ldeabon
Task-oriented strategies-^This was the most frequent category, accountmg for 52% of the third graders' and 60% of the sixth graders' codable responses In it self-insbructions focused on the demands of the waitmg task, the necessity of waibng, or the conbngency itself For example, "If you wait you get two marshmallows If you don't, you only get one I would say it at least five times" (8-5) "Boy, Jenna, if you nng Ae bell you only get one Better wait for the grown-up" The next most frequent category, accounbng for 29% of the third graders' and 14% of the sixth graders' codabie responses, was dtstractton-thmkmg about somethmg.
anythmg, other than the delay situabon For example, "I wonder what I can do now Hum I think I'll read a book unbl she gets back m the room" (8-6) "You can take your mmd off of it, and think of Chnstmas or somethmg hke that But the point is-^think about something else" (11-3)
Ten elementary school children suggested sbategies involving cogntttve transformations of the rewards or of their own arousal state For example, "I don't want to eat the marshmallows They are yukky" (8-4) "I'm stuffed Then I would not want the marshmallows" (11-7)
Five chddren suggested that positive tdeatton and even consummatory ideabon about the rewards might help them to wait For example, "It looks good and fiuffy" (8-9), and "I could sit on my hands but if I had to say something to help me wait, I would thmk about how yummy the marshmallows were, all coated with white, tasbng so sweet mside" (10-11)
The two coders agreed 98% on the taskonented and disbaction categones and 96% on each of the two reward-ideabon categones Disagreements were easdy resolved by discussion, and the final codmg appears m Table 2 Reasons for Ideation Preferences
The reasons the chddren gave for their choices of consummatory VCTSUS task-onented and consummatory versus abstract ideabon shed addibonal hght on the development of their understandmg For both ideabon choices, most preschoolers said "I don't know " Some referred to the attracbveness of the rewards (eg, "I hke them"), others simply restated or rephrased the original ideabon they had chosen (eg, "Because they are yummy and chewy") The types of answers seemed unrelated to their choices Only one chdd referred to the mobvabng effect of his chosen (task-onented) ideabon " it rranmds me to wait" (4-8)
In contrast, both third and sixth graders frequently supported their preferences Twenty-three of the 54 who diose task-onented ldeabon referred to the increased mobvabon and reassurance that it would provide "It would give me self-confidence" (8-2), "It will convince you to wait" (11-3). Twenty others said that task-onented ideabon would provide distracbon and reduce temptation. For example, "If you keep saymg it, it will keep you busy" (8-8), "It will hdp me because then I wdl remember they're not mine yet" Twenty-two of the 26 sixth graders who chose abstract ideabon spoke of the delaydefeabng arousal produced by consummatory ldeabon and/or of the temptabon-reducmg consequences of abstract ideabon For example, "I can't eat puffy clouds, and it won't make me hungry (10-11) Although third graders as a group did not significantly prefer abstract ideation, a few of those who did seemed to imply some awareness of its arousal-reducmg effect, for example, "Clouds do not taste good!" (8-0) DISCUSSION The results presented so far suggest a clear developmental progression m chddren's knowledge and understandmg of effecbve delay strategies The preschoolers m this study did not appear to taiow any of the mles for makmg delay less difficult by not attending to the rewards or by usmg vanous types of ldeabon dunng the delay penod Most of the third graders seemed to know that not attending to (covenng rather than exposmg) the rewards vnll make delay less aversive and easier In addibon, they recognized that taskonented ldeabon will enhance delay more than ldeabon about the consummatory properbes of the revrards While third graders generally were aware of the beneficial effects of remmdmg themselves of the delay contmgency, they did not systemabcally prefer abstract over consummatory ldeabon about the rewards But by the time they reached the sixth grade, most children knew that abstract ideabon about the rewards woidd help them to delay more than consummatory ideabon even though they conbnued to prefer consummatory ideabon in a nondelay context The development of the avoidance of consummatory ideation does not refiect a general change m children's ideabonal preferences with age smce chddren at all ages studied preferred consummatory to abstract ideabon m a nondelay context Developmental progress occurred in the oldest children's clear recognibon that abstract ideation about the rewards would make delay of grabficabon easier than consummatory ideabon about them
We know from previous research that when children are mstructed to "frame" the rewards mentally and to tum them mto a "picture m your head," their abiLty to delay IS greatly enhanced, even more so than when
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they are instructed to engage m comparable lnterestmg mental operabons that simply distract them from the rewards altogether (see Moore, Mischel, & Zeiss, 1976) In ^ite of the demonstrated efficacy of these transformations to abstract or distance the rewards, considerable cognibve matunty seems to be reqmred to recognize the value of such bansformations as measured by the choice to engage m them and the abdity to support this choice with well-elaborated reasons The abdity to generate absbact ideabon about the rewards as a delay sbategy may come even later Some of the sixth graders m the present study suggested construmg the rewards m a negabve way and/or negatmg their own arousal, but none spontaneously generated absbact ideabon about the rewards as a means to facditate delay of gratificabon The delay sbategies suggested by the children themselves also reflected a clear developmental progression in their knowledge of delay rules While a few preschoolers suggested task and delay-contmgency cogmbons or self-disbacbon, the great majonty did not seem to offer clear or viable sbategies for effecbve delay By third grade, m contrast, children offered and reasonably justified a number of potentially viable delay strategies Often they focused on the task and contmgency, remmdmg themselves of the task requirement and outcomes ("If you wait you get two marshmallows, if you don't you ordy get one marshmallow") They also often mdicated the value of distracbon from the rewards or of cognibve bansformabons both of the rewards (to make them less tempbng) or of their own arousal state A few sbll suggested that posibve ideation about the rewards ("It looks good and fluffy") will help, and one wonders if these are the very youngsters for whom delay is likely to be most difficult By the time they reached sixth grade, the children's ovra delay strategies (just hke their choice preferences) showed considerable sophisticabon They were capable of suggesbng temptabon-reiducmg transformabons of the rewards (" the marshmallows are filled with an evd spell') and of their motivabonal state ("I hate marshmallows I can't stand them But when the grown-up gets back, 111 say to myself 'I love marshmallows' and eat it") It would be premature and unwise to draw firm conclusions from the present data about the young chddren's lack of awareness of any effecbve mles for delay Indeed, much of the history of the field has suggested that conclusions about what young chddren do not know often reflect inadequacies m die methods of the mvesbgators more than hmitabons m the knowledge of the chddren (eg, Gehnan, 1978) Therefore, we conducted a second study with improved procedures and a greatly expanded sample or chddren from age 3 to age 8
Study n
OVERVIEW Study II was designed to assess m greater depth and detail young children's knowledge of basic mles for waitmg withm the same delay-of-gratificabon paradigm First, the size and range of the subject sample was expanded, and we attempted a more finegrained analysis of age effects m young chddren Second, m Study I minor differences m the procedures for the preschool and for the elementary school subjects may have resulted m the elementary school children perceivmg the delay situabon as more hypothetical than did tiie preschoolers Thus the older chddren's greater knowledge of the delay rules may have been the result of the delay Situation bemg less real and less difficult, frustratmg, or arousing for them than it was for the preschoolers "Hie presentabon of the delay situabon m Study II therefore was made more clearly hypothebcal, to closely parallel the presentabon made to the elementary school chddren m the first study This change permits us to assess younger cluldren's knowledge of delay rules in an opbmum situabon, comparable to the one for older chddren m the first study SUBJECTS Subjects were 203 children, 102 males and 101 females, rangmg m age from 3-0 to 7-11 (mean age = 4-10, median age = 4-8) All attended a preschool or one of two afterschool care programs The subjects from all samples of the second study were drawn from the same pnmanly upper-middk-class populabon of the Stanford commumty as those m the first study Because preliminary tests revealed no differences m me responses of chddren from the different samples, m Study II then-data were combmed m the followmg analyses Preliminary y^ tests also showed no sex differences approachmg significance m any of the choices, allowmg us to ccmibine males and females m the following data analyses PHOCEDUHES, STIMULI, AND DESIGN The basic procedures, sbmuh, and design were the same as those for the presdiool children m Study I, with some exceptions To provide comparabihty with ti^ proc^ures employed with the elementary school subjects m Study I, we added the instruction, "Let's pretend that a grown-up cranes to your school and takes you mto a room like this," designed to make it clear to the diild that he or she would not actually be left to wait for the delayed reward as part of the session Chddren chose first to have the rewards either covered or exposed, and after they dx>se, the reasons for their preference were ratplored They then were asked to suppose that the rewards had to remam exposed and to descnbe what they could do or say (their own strategies) to help them wait with Ae rewards in full view We found that some duldren m Study I responded to the request for a verbal delay strategy by descnbing or demonstratmg strategies such as covenng their eyes with then-hands We therefore added "things they could do" so that the young children m Study II would feel free to express any type of delay strategy, motonc as well as cognibve, m any way they could Any strategies the chddren suggested were explored to assess their understandmg of how they would help Then they were asked to choose which one of twopmrases would help them most to wart with the rewards exposed durmg the delay penod One phrase was task oriented (I am waitmg for the two marshmallows"), the other focused on the consummatoiy quabties of the delayed rewards ("The marshmallows are yummy and chewy") Agam, reasons for their choices were explored ^ The choice of consummatoiy versus abstract ideabon about the reward was omitted because the results of Study I made it dear that knowledge of the rule uiat delay is facihtated by a focus on the abstract versus consummatory quahties of the rewards does not appear unbl late m the elementary school years 1 Due to bme bnutabons m some testmg sessions, 24 duldren were not asked to suggest their own strategies for waibng with the rewards m view or to dioose between task-on^ed and consununatory ideati<»i AnoAer 50 duldren were iwt given the ideation dunce, abhoudi there was enon^ bme to adc for ti^ir own strategy su^esbons. All 203 duldren made ue cover veisos expose durfee
RESULTS
Choice of Delay Strategies
Covenng versus exposing the rewardsAn analysis of the chddren's choices to cover versus expose the rewards was grouped by age under 4, 4-0 to 4-11, 5-0 to 5-11, and 6 and over TTiis yielded an overall x*(3) = 21 02, p < 001, mdicabng increasing awareness that it helps to have tibe rewards covered rather than exposed dunng delay Not surprisingly, below 4 years the children showed no systemabc preference for covenng versus exposmg the rewards as an effecbve delay strategy By 4 years, however, this picture changes dramatically Stnkmgly, and unexpectedly, the young 4-year-olds significantly preferred to expose the rewards-^a strategy which has been demonstrated to make delay most difficult for children this age (eg, Mischel, 1981a) As Figure 1 shows, this
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effect IS specific to chddren m the first half of their fourth year, and the preference for exposing the rewards to help delay wanes by the end of that year Children from 4 to 4Ji years showed a highly significant preference for having the rewards in view dunng the delay period, while children below age 4 and from 43» to 5 years showed no sigmficant preference for covering versus exposmg ihe rewards, x^{2) = 17 88, p < 001 In the fifth year, the preference begins to shift toward favoring the objecbvely helpful strategy of covenng the rewards to facilitate waitmg for them but is still not significantly different from chance The preference for covenng the rewards becomes significant for chddren age 6 years and older, x^(l) = 10 32, p < 005 Figure 2 shows, below age 5 years there is no systemabc preference Table 1) Correlations between age and delay knowledge -Correlational analyses confirmed the picture provided by the x^ analyses of the choices Each child was assigned a "knowledge score" from 0 to 2 for the number of correct answers given about the basic delay rules (cover/expose, consummatory/ task-onented) The overall correlabon Between these knowledge scores and age was 325 (iV=142, p< 001)
Task-onented tdeatton versus consummatory ideation-As
Reasons for Choosir^ to Cover versus Expose the Rewards
The children's dioice faeferences yielded clear and coherent results which we attempted to supplement with more subjecbve, l^s formal data about their developmg understandmg of effective delay rules Consider, first, responses to our mquuy, "How will having the marshmallows [either "covered" or "left-out," depending on the chdd's dioice] help you to wait for the two marshmallowsp" CeneraDy, the youngest children (up to about age 4) did not relate their choices to their anbcipated expenences durmg the delay penod Most of them said "I don't know," "I just want to," or simply remamed silent A few descnbed to us that they would not see the rewards if they were covered, or would see them if they were exposed, but did not say how this would affect than One chdd under age 4 did say that covenng the rewards would prevent him from vioktmg the delay contmgency, but did so without specifymg ihs mediatmg expenence of reduced arousal or temptation, almost as if die cover were a physicd banrirar-"So DO won't eat them so [I] won't take them" (3-11) Another, choosing to have the rewards m view dunng the delay penod, expressed trust concems "Leave them out then they don't disappear" (3-6)
We mtensively mterviewed 10 of the 4-4K-year-olds and scrubnized all of the responses of children m this age range with special mterest, searching for possible clues ahout why, at this age, they systemabcally preferred what empirical evidence suggests IS a delay-defeatmg strategy Only eight of the 47 children age 4-4X chose to have the rewards covered, and only four of the eight responded at all to the mquiry Of these four, only one boy (4-3) went lieyond stabng that covenng the marshmallows would result m not seemg them (eg," 'cause then I won't see them") and seemed to begin to deal with the affecbve and cogmbve consequences " because it has to be a surprise if you see It first, then it won't be a surprise "
How did the children in this age group who chose to have the rewards m view durmg the delay period support this choice"* Most of them did not In response to the inquiry, more than one-half said "I don't know," remamed silent, reiterated their choice, or said that they liked them to be uncovered One child seemed to mdicate an awareness of the debihtabng effect of the sbmulus arrangement he had chosen " and if I was sitbng here alone then I would just nng the bell" (4-0) When reasons were given by children at this age to justify their preference for exposmg the rewards, they focused on their desire for the marshmallows and the reluctance to have them covered, for example, " because I like to see tiiose-'cause I like marshmallows a lot" (4-2) One child indicated that having the rewards m view would make the wait shorter However, his explanabon of how it would be shorter made It clear that he was refemng not to the impact of reward exposure on subjecbve bme dunng the delay penod but rather to how rapidly the reward would be delivered after the experimenter's retum "Well, if I put this [the cover] on, then the lady would have to take It off It would take a long time to take It off' (4-3) Nme of the 15 duldren age 4^-5 years who chose to have the rewards m view supported this choice m terms of the anbcipated delay-enhancmg dBFect of the increased trust and incenbve that seemg the rewards will
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produce For example, "Then I can just watch them so they won't walk away" (4-9)
Recall that by around age 5 mcreasmg numbers of children chose to have the rewards covered dunng the delay penod Whde many (11 out of 36) 434-53i-year-olds choosing cover said "I don't know" when asked for a reason, others seemed to realize that covenng the rewards would reduce frustrabve arousal and the temptabon to terminate the delay penod, for example, " when you come back it seems shorter 'cause you haven't been gone shorter but it seems shorter 'Cause you aren't looking" (4-10) " 'Cause I won't remember about them, and 111 just wait " (Will It be harder to wait if the marshmallows are left out hke this?) "Yes because I feel the yummmess of them and I like to have them then" (5-5) Toward the end of their fifth year mcreasing numbers of children seemed to recognize that with the rewards in view, they would engage m consummatory ideabon which would create so much arousal that they could not contmue to delay, for example, "It would j'ust seem like there were no marshmallows m this room and I couldn't be able to smell 'em and I would hardly even know they were m here so I can wait" ( if they were left out?) "Then you would know they are here You just want them and you can't wait" (5-9)
Reasons for Choosmg Task-ortented versus Consummatory Ideation
The chddren's reasons for prefemng task-onented versus consummatory ideabon below age 5 generally indicated the same lack of certainty that their random objecbve choices suggested Before age 5, most chddren said "I don't know" or did not reply at all Only four of the 39 children vwio chose task-onented ideabon even offered a reason, and only one chdd seemed to suggest that it would guide his behavior, "'cause then you don't nng the bell" (3-11) The others said, "Just because that's the easiest" (4-7), " I just vrant to say that" (4-11), or reiterated the contmgency Six of the 36 chddren under age 5 who chose consummatory ideabon mdicated that focusing on the rewards would be pleasurable "Because I want to" (3-10), "Because it makes me feel good" (4-11)
By around age 5-^when their significant preference for task-onented versus consummatory ideabon emerged-some chddren (five out of 20 age 5-534-year-olds) also began to note that this choice would reduce temptabon For example, "Because that will sorta get my mmd on somethmg else" (5-1)
The hazards of consummatory ideabon remam sahent to the older chddren, for example, "[If I said yummy] I would have to nng the bell" (5-7), "Because you really reaUy want to eat them, really and your stomach gets hungner and hungner for the two marshmallows so you want to wait unbl the teacher comes back It would be harder to wait [if I said yummy] because you really really really teally reaUy really really want to eat them so badly that you can't wait, so you have to put the other idea" (6-2)
The value of task-onented ideabon as a self-instrucbon was noted by two young 5-year-olds "By remmdmg yourselF (5-3), "Because then I know, know, know, how to behave Because then I get the beat" (5-4) The guidmg funcbon of focusmg on the task contmues to be appreciated as the children grow older For example, "Because if I forget I'm waibng 111 eat Uiem" (5-7), "It makes me feel that I can wait 'cause that's what It says" (6-3)
Strategtes Suggested by the Children
Recall that to explore further the chddren's own ideas about resistance to temptabon we also asked them to suppose that tfiey were waibng with the delayed rewards uncovered in front of them and to tell us what they then could do, or say, to help themselves wait The strategies the chddren volunteered provide further clues about the growth of their understanding of effective resistance to temptabon Overall, 116 of the 179 children asked to suggest a delay strategy gave some response, penmttmg a detailed analysis of children's self-generated copmg mechamsms Forty-two children gave no response at all or said "I don't know", 17 children gave responses that were unintelligible to either of two independent judges, and four chddren's reasons, u any, were lost due to equipment fadure Most of the youngest chddren (ages 3-4 years) gave unscorable or unintefligible (to us) responses, said "I don't know," or remained sdent But even at the youngest ages, some began to tell us about the value of bemg distracted from the rewards or of making statements that focus on the task of waiting for the preferred rewards Six out of the 30 children under age 4 expressed sbategies of disbaction by directmg their attenbon away from the rewards or changing the stimulus situabon (eg, "Close two eyes" [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , "Put the cover on them" [3-3]), or subsbtute acbvibes (eg, "I would talk to the wall" [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] , "Play with the knob" [3-10]) Thus even before the age at which there is a systematic preference for having the rewards covered dunng the delay pwnod, at least some young chddren refer to directing their attention elsewhere With increasing age, more and more children generated sbategies, and the number remaining silent, giving unmtelhgible responses, or saying "I don't know" decreased steadily The responses were coded by two independent judges The first judge read all the responses and was instructed to code them into the fewest number of categones that emerged from the data As in Study I, the two largest categories were task oriented and distraction Instances of the other two categories employed m Study I occurred only rarely with the younger children m Study II and were included m a miscellaneous "Others" category, described later These categones were then given to the second judge who mdependently sorted the responses mto them (see Table 2 ) Fourteen chddren ex- 0 pressed more than one strategy, and the judges disagreed m four cases about which was the pnmary strategy (although they agreed 100% about the codmg of each individual strategy) The judges agreed 96% on the responses m the distraction category and 96% on the task-onented category, and 99% on the uncodable responses AU disagreements were resolved by discussion The final codmg appears m Table 2 Dtstractton was the largest category {N = 71) In each of these responses the strategy mvolved mentally or physically engagmg m some acbvity other than waitmg Some were techniques for not lookmg at the rewards, such as dosmg eyes, tummg around in the chair, covenng the rewards, or askmg the adult to hide them One 4-year-old's strategy was notable because it detailed her rejecbon of exphcit consummatory ideabon m favor of avoidmg attendmg to the rewards "[I could think about] eatmg the marshmallows-that wouldn't be very good because I would want more-I could look m the mirror" (4-2) Begmnmg at around age 5, duldren suggest^ strategies that went beyond simply not lookmg at the rewards, and with mcreasmg age were able to explam how these would facihtate delay, for example, "Play with my fingers" (5-4), " thmk about all the good things Fm doing m school so I won't be tempted to eat [the marshmallovi^] right away" (6-1), "Smg a song Then you'll have somethmg to do when you don't have anythmg to do it's hard 'cause you just look at them If you have any books around, you can read" (7-2)
In the categoiy task onented were strategies that stated the reward conbngency or emphasized the necessity of vi^utmg Some of these strategies contamed self-instrucbons about how to wait, mduding self-commands about global affective states, for example, "be brave" and "be cahn " A few of the 26 strategies m this category were well elaborated even at an early age For example, " I'm not gomg to eat these, these two marshmalbvirs, Fm sbll not gomg to because you need to wait to eat these two marshmallows when the grown-up comes bade I get the two marehmaUows" (3-9) With increasmg age, some answers became more detaded and mduded the consequencra <rf not waitmg "[I wouM say] Do not nng die bell u you rmg the bell and die teacher cranes m sneil pax up d^ one marshmallow and put it m MiBchel and Mischel 615 your hand And you eat that one marshmallow" (5-0), "I'll wait so I can get the two marshmallows mstead of one" (5-4) Others (N = 19) was a miscellaneous category It mcluded a small group of chddren (N = 14) who anbcipated that they would not be able to wait For example, I could nng the bell" (3-1), "I could keep trickmg the grovwi-ups, see, when he's away, keep eabng the thmgs that are on the tray" (4-4), "Eat the two marshmallows and the one marshmallow" (5-6) Tvro diddren m the "others" category sbessed their obhgabon to wait, for example, "I would say 'I shouldn't eat 'em' so I won't eat 'em" (4-6) And three children suggested ways of thmkmg about the rewards diat would be nonarousing, for example, "Marshmallows will be rotten left out they're gonna get afl moldy I won't eat the marshmallows 'cause they're all moldy and spoded" (5-3) DISCUSSION Study II helps to clanfy m considerable detail the young chdd's grovwng understandmg of basic rules for delay of gratificabon The overall results mdicate that 5-year-olds begm to significantly reject consummatory ldeabon about the rewards m favor of taskonented ideabon as a strategy for waibng At that age many begin to arbculate psychological reasons to justify this preference They recognize the problem of increased temptation produced by thinking about the consummatory attributes of the delayed rewards, and also heffn to recognize the value of focusmg on the task acbvity Likewise, by about age 6, most chddren prefer covering the rewards, rather than exposmg them, as a strategy for effecbve delay of gratificabon Perhaps most mteresbng and theorebcally provocative is the curious findmg that duldren m the first half of their fourth year strongly preferred to have the rewards exfKJsed; rather than covered during the delay penod, thus choosing an objecbvely delaydefeabng strategy of 3ie worst sort This findmg IS juso consistent with the generalized preference chddren of this age show for attending to the "real rewards" rather than to more symbolic representabons whde trymg to wait for them, thereby making delay more diflScult for themselves (Yates & Mischel, 1979) Civen the evidence that havmg the rewards m view hmders delay most dramabcally for chddren of this age (eg, Mischel, 1974 (eg, Mischel, , 1981a , it is important to attempt to understand why these youngsters prefer a delay-defeabng strategy before they shift to a preference for the objecbvely effecbve one In makmg this "error" of expectmg that exposing the rewards violl help delay more than covenng them, the yoimg 4-year-olds are makmg the same mcorrect predicbon made by Mischel and his associates m their first studies of the objecbve delay rules (eg, Misdiel, 1974 , Mischel et al, 1972 It is also the same predicbon derived from Freud's (1911 Freud's ( /1959 ) discussion of the transibon from pnmary to secondary process thinkmg m the development of delay of grabficabon Ao cordmg to the psychoanalybc formulabon, ldeabon anses mibaUy when there is a block or delay in the process of direct gratificabon discharge (Rapaport, 1967, p 315 ) Dunng such externally imposed delay, Freud suggested, the child constructs a "hallucmatory wish-fulfilhng image" of the need-sabsfymg object As a result of frequent associabon of tension reducbon with goal objects, and the development of greater ego organizabon, Ae imposed delay of sabsfying objects gradually results m the subsbtubon of hallucinatory sabsfacbons and other thought processes that convert "free cathexes" mto "bound cathexes" (eg, Freud, 1911 /1959 , Smger, 1955 Although the exact process is undear, presumably the presence of the object, or cues about It, should facihtate the "time bmdmg" imagery through which the delay mterval is bndged A simdar predicbon was generated by Mischel (1974) and his associates, who reasoned that effecbve delay would depend on self-mstnicbonal processes through which the mdivKiual mcreases the sahence of the delayed consequences of his or her behavior From that viewpomt, any factors (situabonal or withm the mdividual) that make delayed consequences more vivid should facditate impulse control Such a view, while focusmg on the self-msbrucbonal components of attenbon to delayed outcomes, also nnphes covert selfreinforcement processes through which mdividuals may reinforce their own delay behavior by vividly anbcipatmg some or the rewarding consequences that the waitmg will produce It predicts-^mcorrectly-that delay should be easier when the desired objects are available for attenbon Extensive research m tibe last decade now allows a better understandmg of die role of reward-recant cogmbon durmg delay of gratificabon and helps danfy the confusion m the onginal theorebcal predicbons-and perhaps ako m the 4-year-olds Namely, a focus on the consummatory ("hot") quahties of the desired objects makes delay most di£S-cult, a focus on their symbohc, abstract, "cool," or lnformabve quahbes makes delay much easier-indeed, even easier than distracbon firom them altogether (Mischel, 1974 , 1981a , Mischel & Moore, 1980 Recogmtion of this subtle distmction was shown by the sixth graders (Study I) m their significant preference for abstract versus consummatory ideation about the rewards m a delay context So what are the lmphcabons for the 4-year-olds' "error'? We propose diat (like tl^ researchers) the youngsters may confuse the "wishful" with the objecbvely effecbve sbategy While exposure to the rewards (and consummatory ideabon about them) is a wish-fulfilhng strategy (as Freud noted), it IS not a strategy that allows effecbve delay behavior in reahty That is, the young 4-yearold may not be disbnguishmg adequately between what he or she wants and wluit will help, and insists on bemg able to see die desired object without bemg able to suppress the fnistrative arousal it mduces The recognibon that one must avoid exposure to what one wants (or abstract it) m order to endure delay for it does not seem to emerge tmbl later The young chddren do not realize that if the revrards are left m view they will dunk about them, and wdl do so m consummatory ways that are too arousmg for further delay If the rewards were less compeOmg or arousing, would these young duldren recognize that covenng the desired objects facihtates delay? In a pilot study, we asked six chddren age 4-4J4 what would help a frog puppet wait for two green leaves All said it would help the frog to have the leaves out in view rather than covered durmg the delay penod Thus even without the "pull" of rewards relevant to themselves and m the absence of their ovsTi involvement, children this age do not seem to dioose the delay-fadlitabng sbmulus arrangement
In the present data (Study II), the recognibon that It helps to cover rather than expose the desired objects is not dearly evident unbl about the sixth year On the other hand, if the metacogmbon of delay is assessed with different methods (eg, different companson choices, different self-control paradigms), awareness of effective self-control mles might be obtamed at even earlier ages Indeed, m the present sample the strategic suggested by me chddrrai themselves mdicate some awar«iess of the value of distrac-tion to resist temptabon m at least a few younger chddren Note that, m spite of their overwhelming choice to expose the rewards, 20 of the 47 4-4)4-year-olds suggested sbategies for waibng that mvolve distracbon from the desired objects and from the frustrabon of waiting when the rewards are m view Another seven children m this age range suggested some strategy for delay when exposed to the rewards, but none at this age (or mdeed at any age m Study II) suggested engagmg m consummatory ideabon about the rewards as a delay sbategy In sum, the young 4-year-oIds, when given a choice to cover or expose the desired objects m a delay situabon, prefer to expose them, yet when asked what will help them wait if they are expo^ to the desired objects, many suggest distracbon At this age, many seem to beheve they will delay best if they see the rewards but distract themselves from them Their metacogmbve error IS their fadure to realize diat they cannot do this when exposed to the rewards, they do not seem able to execute the necessary selfinstructions to allow such copmg This is seen in the repeated finding that when exposed to the rewards youngsters at this age find delay of gratificabon most di£Bcult and do not maintain it (Mischel, 1974) Thus, at least m the delay-of-gratificabon paradigm, young 4-year-olds seem to create self-defeatmg dilemmas for themselves by choosmg (or even creating) a temptmg environment without adequately anbcipatmg that they will not be able to execute sbategies to overcome the temptabon
Conclusions: Stndies I and II
Taken collectively. Studies I and II trace the development of knowledge of basic delay mles in chddren through grade 6 The first study suggested (incorrectly) that preschoolers Old not know any of the basic delay mles studied, but by third grade knew two basic delay rules it is preferable to wait with the rewards covered rather than exposed, and to engage m task-onented rather than consummatory ldeabon A protocol that made it dear that the delay situabon was hypothebcal, and the fine-grained analysis of delay knowledge permitted by the kurger number of young chddren m Study II, revealed that diese two basic delay rules began to be known by about the end of the fifth year and certamly within the sixth year The tracmg of choices over 6-month mtervals revealed an unexpected tum m the development of the mle to cover ratha: than expose the desired objects Under age 4 duldren showed no systematic preference for covenng or exposing the rewards At the begmnmg of their fourth year, they strongly preferred to have the rewards m view dunng the delay penod, thus selecbng a wish-onented but objecbvely delay-defeatmg strategy The possible reasons for this reliable but puzzlmg effect (see also Yates & Mischel, 1979) were discussed and related to the equally incorrect predicbon about the effecbveness of attenbon to the rewards offered by Mischel and his associates (eg, 1974) and denved from Freud (1911 Freud ( /1959 Toward the end of the fourth year, this preference for viewing the desired objects wanes, begmnmg at around age 5 increasing numbers of children choose the delay-facditatmg sbategy, significantly preferrmg to have the rewards covered by about age 6
Analysis of strategies for waibng suggested by the chddren mdicates that some may have awareness of basic delay-facditabng mles at even earlier ages Whde most young 4-year-olds prefer to expose the rewards during delay, many suggest that distracbon would help them wait if they have to delay with the desired objects m view Their metacogmbve error seems to be the fadure to anticipate suflSciendy that they will not be able to execute effecbve delay strategies if exposed to the desired objects We speculate that this failure (eg, Mischel, 1974) occurs because when young children see the desired objects they ideate about them pnmanly in arousing (consummatory) ways that make the fmstrabon of conbnmng delay too great (Mischel, 1974 (Mischel, , 1981a ) Some evidence for this comes from Toner (1981) , who found that the delay maintenance of preschool children in a no-mstrucbon condition was not significantly different from that of children who verbalized or heard statements about the good taste of the candy reward The young 4-year-olds' preference for structurmg a temptation-filled environment (eg, by exposing the desired rewards) thus makes them vulnerable to their own arousmg ideabon and potenbal victims of environmental pressures they cannot resist after creabng them m the first place Further investigabons of this phenomenon seem most challengmg to us The older child, in contrast, anticipates that if die delayed objects are exposed he (she) will become too fmstrabvely aroused by them. thus makmg contmued delay too difficult Consequently, the older children can create a more favorable environment (eg, rewards covered) for effecbve self-control Cross-study compansons always require caubon But because the younger children m Study II were given procedures designed to be^ basically comparable to those for the older ones m Study I, and because all chddren were sampled from the same populabon, some compansons are worth explonng, albeit tentabvely Thus note that the significant preference for delay-facditatmg strategies of covermg the rewards and engaging m taskonented rather than consummatory ideabon shown by about age 6 years (Study II) is not appreciably greater m the chddren at grade 3 and grade 6 (Study I) compare, for example. Figures 1 and 2 with Table 1 This asymptote may partly refiect that older chddren may have more altemabve strategies readdy avadable to them and do not have to rely on any one exclusively For mstance. It may matter less to the older child whether the rewards are covered or exposed smce she can reduce the "sbmulus pull" of unavoidable temptabons by transformmg them cognibvely or distracbng herself mentally even when they are m view
The greater avadabdity of alternative sbategies vwth increasing age may also imderlie the significant decrease with age found m the relabve frequency of distracbon compared to task-onented self-mstrucbons m the chddren's suggested strategies This decrease IS seen when we compare! the strategies suggested by the older (Study I) and younger (Study II) children As Table 3 shows, isbaction is the strategy ovrarwhelmmgly offered by younger chddren, older chddren, m contrast, suggest more task-onented strategies, xHl) =26 77, p< 001
The generahty of young chddren's rehance on some way of "turmng off" or inhibits mg attenbon to an attracbve and arousmg 
Distraction
14
Nora -x«(l) -26 77, p < 001
Stimulus IS supported by a senes of studies m which preschoolers are mobvated to work on a long task m the face of tempbng disbacbons a Clown Box who talks, flashes hghts, and shows toys to them (Mischel & Patterson, 1978) In this situabon, the most frequent strategies mvented by the chddren were ones that attempted to counter or eliminate the temptabon (eg, "don't talk to me," "stop that," "don't bother me") Systemabc studies of the effecbveness of plans m this resistance-to-temptabon paradigm have shown that for preschoolers, a plan to inhibit attenbon to the disbacbon ("I'm not gomg to look at Mr Clown Box") was more effecbve as measured by bme spent on the instrumental task than a plan that focused attenbon on the task ("I'm going to look at my work") (Patterson & Mischel, 1976) Likevsnse, disbacbve (compared to "on-task") cognibon was found to be associated with longer delay bme m a delay paradigm more similar to the present one with a sample of 5-8-year-olds (Yates et al, 1981) The shift m the chddren's suggested strategies from disbacbon to task-onented sbategies found m the current studies at around age 8 raises the quesbon of whether there might also be a shift m the empincally effecbve strategy for mamtammg self-control at about this age
The delay rule that does not seem to become available imtd later in childhood (somebme between the third and sixth grade) requires recognibon of the value of abstract rather than consummatory ideabon The possible links between the development of this understanding and the child's achievmg operabonal thought in the Piageban sense seem mtngumg In another direcbon, the relabonship between what chddren tell us about delay strategic and their actual ability to wait and work for delayed gratificabon effectively also seems worth explonng, and we are now pursmng that route
